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Abstract
This thesis deals with the modeling of economic systems in the context of agri-
cultural and power systems, and some aspects of the difference between the stan-
dard economics equilibrium approach and the agent-based approach. We model
the supply side, where agents make decisions on what to produce or in what to
invest. These decisions are based on predictions of future prices and other market
conditions. In all settings time lags and limited foresight are important. Whereas
standard economics is based on the idea of economic equilibrium, agent-based
modeling describes dynamic systems based on the interaction of agents who do
not necessarily possess perfect information and rationality.
This thesis consists of three parts. In papers I-III we present a model of inter-
acting markets with cobweb characteristics, i.e. markets where prices are prone
to oscillations due to a time lag between supply and demand decisions. We ap-
ply the model to land-use competition between food and bioenergy crops. We
show how instability in one agricultural market, e.g. the bioenergy crops market,
can be transferred to other agricultural markets, both on the supply side (by the
limited availability of land) and on the demand side (by consumers choosing be-
tween different goods). Under certain circumstances the agent-based dynamics
can be projected to a closed dynamics of aggregate quantities, which allows for
the stability characteristics to be analytically approached. In paper IV we present
a model of beef cattle dynamics based on decisions taken by boundedly rational
farmers. We systematically examine the parameters determining the agents’ ex-
pectations and decision mechanisms, and their impacts on the dynamics. In paper
V we study a power system transition triggered by a carbon tax. We find that the
level of carbon tax needed to reach a specific CO2 mitigation target may be sig-
nificantly higher in an agent-based model than in the corresponding optimization
model.
In all papers we focus on mechanisms and model characteristics rather than
on predictions.
Keywords: Agent-based modeling, non-equilibrium, Cobweb model, price fluc-
tuations, stability, market interaction, agricultural land-use, power system transi-
tions
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In a free market producers make decisions on what good to supply, when to do it
and how much of it. Consider a farmer who grows crops. In the autumn he might
choose to plant wheat. He decides what fertilizer to use and perhaps he invests in
new equipment that will increase the yield. The following season the farmer sells
his produce on the market and the aggregated quantity supplied and consumer
demand determines the market price. The realized profit is therefore a function
of not only the decisions made by the individual farmer, but also of the decisions
made by other producers on the market, on the evolving consumer preferences,
as well as on external shocks such as weather events. Expected profit is usually
at least one of the factors taken into consideration when production decisions are
being made. This means that agents are trying to form expectations about an out-
come that in itself is a function of other agents’ expectations. An economy is an
evolving, complex, adaptive dynamic system (Leijonhufvud, 2006). This thesis
includes five papers that take an agent-based approach to supply side modeling of
agricultural and power systems. Agents are producers of a commodity that is sold
on an open market. The production decision, or investment decision, is governed
by agents’ prediction of future market conditions.
When building his theory of human behavior, Simon (1957) proposed that
agents in an economy have “bounded rationality”. This means firstly that they do
not have perfect information about the world around them. It is costly, or even
impossible, to obtain the information needed to pursue optimal decision rules.
Secondly, even if all information needed were at their fingertips they would not
have the computational capacity to identify the course of action that would maxi-
mize their expected utility. Decision-makers may therefore aim for simply finding
1
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satisfactory solutions rather than optimal ones. In empirical studies it has been
shown that people indeed tend to use simple heuristics, or rules of thumb, when
making decisions under uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973). In models
of bounded rationality the process of choice is explicitly embedded (Rubinstein,
1998). In these models agents form expectations, and make decisions, based on
observable quantities. Simple models with heterogeneous, boundedly rational
agents can explain important observed stylized facts in financial time series, such
as excess volatility, high trading volume, temporary bubbles and trend following,
sudden crashes and mean reversion (Hommes, 2006). Specifying simple agent
behavioral rules in a model, and letting these agents interact may lead to the
emergence of important macro-social structures that are more than just the sum
of the parts, see e.g. Epstein and Axtell (1996).
In contrast to this mindset, modern macroeconomics has adopted a general
equilibrium framework (Leijonhufvud, 2006). This includes a rational agent ap-
proach, which means that the behavior of consumers, firms and investors can be
described as if they behave rationally. Rational agents optimize expected util-
ity and have beliefs that are perfectly consistent with realizations (Muth, 1961).
Equilibrium modeling may be a useful tool for assessing in what direction a sys-
tem is heading, although there are exceptions. The methodology is also valued
for its simplicity since it lets human behavior be captured by simple mathematical
functions, and allows for analytical examination.
However, the economy is not in equilibrium. Financial markets may have
an optimum state but the system might never settle there. The optimum state
can be very sensitive to small changes in the environment and therefore irrele-
vant to understanding what is going on (Bouchaud, 2008). There are many ex-
amples that indicate that economic actors do not have beliefs that are perfectly
consistent with realizations. In year 2003 Sweden introduced green certificates,
a support system intended to increase the share of electricity from renewable en-
ergy sources. One certificate represents generation of 1 MWh of electricity, and
the producer of renewable electricity can sell the certificate on the open market
where the price is determined by supply and demand. The buyers of the certifi-
cates are electricity retailers and other parties with quota obligations. In the last
decade many suppliers have invested in wind power and the installed capacity
has grown substantially. However, the hopes of making profitable investments
did not become reality for most of the early investors. Between 2010 and 2015
the average Nordpool spot price of electricity decreased from around 500 to 200
SEK/MWh (Nordpool, 2017), mainly due to mild weather, high water inflow and
the large expansion of wind power capacity itself (Kriström, 2016). At the same
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time the price of green certificates dropped from around 250 to 150 SEK/MWh
(SKM, 2017). Revenues have not covered costs and many wind turbine owners
face bankruptcy.
Agent-based modeling (ABM) is a more general way of studying economics,
where equilibrium is a special case (Arthur, 2006). New phenomena may emerge
that do not appear in steady state. ABMs are suited to handle real-world aspects
such as asymmetric information, imperfect competition, strategic interaction,
collective learning and the possibility of multiple equilibria (Tesfatsion, 2006).
Agent interactions will sometimes give rise to equilibrium outcomes, and some-
times not. In some cases the simulated economy moves from one equilibrium to
another.
Equilibrium is not necessarily equal to optimum. Tesfatsion (2006) notes
that a system is in equilibrium if all influences acting on the system offset each
other so that the system is in an unchanging condition. This definition does not
include any conception of uniqueness, optimality, or stability with regard to exter-
nal system disturbances. Conversely, the optimum is not necessarily an equilib-
rium state. Take for example integrated assessment models (IAM) which describe
both economic and biophysical systems and the interactions between them. The
majority of IAMs optimize the discounted utility for the world at large, given a
damage function of environmental pollution. However, individual agents (e.g.
decision makers acting in the best interest of their countries) may have incentives
to defect from this state. In that case the world would end up in a sup-optimal
Nash equilibrium (Brede and De Vries, 2013).
ABMs have recently been successfully used in several areas of economics,
including financial markets, technology adoption, lock-in and transfer, business
cycles in macroeconomics, labour networks, firm structure and larger scale agent-
based macroeconomic models (Farmer et al., 2015; Stern, 2016).
1.1 Objective and scope
This thesis deals with the modeling of economic systems and the difference
between the standard economics equilibrium approach and the agent-based ap-
proach. We model the supply side, where agents make decisions on what to
produce or in what to invest. These decisions are based on predictions of fu-
ture prices and other market conditions. In all settings time lags and limited
foresight are important. Whereas standard economics is based on the idea of eco-
nomic equilibrium, agent-based modeling describes dynamic systems based on
the interaction of agents who do not necessarily possess perfect information and
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rationality. We focus on two limitations of equilibrium models: they do not say
anything about the stability of the steady state, nor how a system transitions from
one steady state to another.
In general terms the thesis deals with questions such as:
• Under what conditions does an ABM reach the stable state predicted by the
corresponding equilibrium model?
• How does instability spread from one market to another?
• Under what circumstances is it possible to project an agent-based micro-
dynamics to a closed form dynamics of aggregate variables?
• How will the qualitative results differ when modeling a power system tran-
sition with an ABM instead of an optimization model?
This thesis consists of five appended papers and an introduction to those. The
papers can be grouped into three different parts:
I. In the first part (papers I-III) we present a model of interacting markets with
cobweb characteristics, i.e. markets where prices are prone to fluctuations
due to a time lag between supply and demand decisions. We apply the
model to land-use competition between food and bioenergy crops. We
investigate how instability in one agricultural market, e.g. the bioenergy
crops market, can be transferred to other agricultural markets, both on the
supply side (by the limited availability of land) and on the demand side
(by consumers choosing between different goods). Agents’ methods for
forming expectations of the future, and the degree of inertia of the system,
determine if the model dynamics is stable or not.
II. In the second part (paper IV) we study the emergence of cattle cycles, i.e.
fluctuations of prices and quantities produced over time. We use a model
of boundedly rational farmers and systematically examine the parameters
determining the agents’ expectations and decision mechanisms, and their
impacts on the dynamics. In two model extensions we highlight the link
between beef production and grain price volatility.
III. In the third part (paper V) we study a power system transition triggered
by a carbon tax. We use both an optimization model and an agent-based
model where agents are power companies making investment decisions. In
the ABM we focus on the effect of limited foresight and perceived risk.
Chapter 2
Methods
This thesis focuses on methodology development, an improved understanding of
mechanisms and model characteristics rather than on predictions. The first three
papers have a highly theoretical character while the second two are somewhat
more applied. In this chapter I describe the key methodological approaches that
have been adopted.
2.1 Agent-based modeling
Agent-based modeling is a computational method that enables a researcher to cre-
ate, analyze, and experiment with models composed of agents that interact within
an environment (Gilbert, 2008). In these models individual entities (the agents)
and their interactions are directly represented. The agents may be heterogeneous,
and their decision rules are explicitly specified. The agents interact with each
other which may trigger various kinds of adaptation and learning.
Agent-based models are valued for their ability to represent in a bottom-up
way how individual behavior leads to the emergence of structures at the macro
level that could not easily have been foreseen by simply studying a single agent.
A typical example is swarm behavior, exhibited by e.g. insects, birds, quadrupeds
and fish, where a group of agents move together without any central coordination.
When each entity is modeled as following a few simple rules a swarm behavior
emerges with complex motion and interaction that would have been hard to create
otherwise (see e.g. Reynolds (1987)).
We use agent-based modeling in all five papers in this thesis. The agents in
our models make their production decisions, or investment decisions, based on
5
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their expectations of future prices. They have either a “naive” prediction method,
meaning that they assume current prices to hold in the future, or a more forward-
looking strategy where they try to predict in what direction prices will move. All
of our agents maximize expected profit. Agent-based models are well suited for
also including other types of goal functions or decision rules. For example, in
an interview study with Dutch power companies a frequently stated goal of the
investment decision was to “not do worse than the competition” (Groot, 2013).
This indicates that there is a tendency of imitation between power companies, in
order to avoid doing worse investments that others. This is something that could
be studied with agent-based modeling, but it is not within the scope of this thesis.
In the agent-based models of land-use competition, described in papers I-III,
our agents are heterogeneous in the quality of land that they own and in their
prediction method of future prices, whereas in the models described in papers IV
and V they are homogenous. In all of our models the agents interact via the price
signal they create by supplying their goods to the market. The agents react to this
price signal by using it as a basis for prediction of future prices. In paper I agents
may also update their prediction method based on their past success.
2.2 The cobweb model
The cobweb model is a central concept in papers I-III. A cobweb market has
two main characteristics. Firstly, there is a time lag between supply decision
and price formation. Secondly, the market is characterized by both supply and
demand being elastic with respect to price. That means that suppliers increase
production if the price is high, and decrease production if the price is low. In
the same way, consumers increase their demand if prices are low, and increase
demand if prices are high. The direction of causality goes both ways. If the
quantity supplied to the market increases, the price decreases. This leads to a
negative price expectations feedback. Due to the time lag suppliers must base
their production decision on expectations of the future price of the good. If they
expect a price higher (lower) than the fundamental price, the realized price will
sink below (rise above) the fundamental price.
In “The Cobweb Theorem” Ezekiel (1938) offered an explanation to the cy-
cles that had been observed in, e.g., the ratio of hog-corn prices (see Fig. 2.1).
Corn has been considered the ideal feed for hogs in the US, and a hog was “noth-
ing more than fifteen or twenty bushels of corn” (Holt and Craig, 2006). The rule
on the farm thus became that as long as the price of twenty bushels of corn was
less than the 200 pounds of various cuts that a hog could yield, it was profitable
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to feed corn to hogs. This created the hog-corn cycle. If the relative price of corn
was low, farmers would breed more hogs. This behavior put upward pressure on
the price of corn and once the hogs were delivered to the market their selling price
would decrease. As the price ratio changed farmers would cut back on hog pro-
duction; corn inventories would begin to accumulate; and the cycle would begin
again.
Figure 2.1: U.S. hog-corn price ratio 1910-2006, illustrated by Holt and Craig (2006)
The character of expectations and their effect on market dynamics in dif-
ferent circumstances have been extensively studied. Ezekiel assumed “naive”
expectations, where future expected values are set equal to the latest observa-
tion of the corresponding variable. Nerlove (1958) suggested that farmers update
their expectations over time in proportion to the latest prediction error. Prediction
methods based on rules of thumb and past prices are often referred to as bound-
edly rational. In contrast to these, Muth (1961) proposed a rational expectation
hypothesis, stating that decision-makers make efficient use of information, just
as they do of other scarce resources. In modeling exercises this often translates
into agents having full knowledge of future prices, less any random error term.
As we might suspect, expectation formation is decisive for a model’s stability.
This explains why rational expectations models tend to ascribe the volatility of
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the economy to large outside shocks, while models with boundedly rational ex-
pectations attribute the volatility to the inherent features of the economy and/or
relatively small outside shocks.
In controlled laboratory experiments Hommes et al. (2007) and Hommes
(2011) found evidence that the rational expectations hypothesis is not an accu-
rate description of realized prices in unstable cobweb-type commodity markets.
Instead, they found that real agents use different simple heuristics, or rules of
thumb, to predict future prices, and that a heterogeneous expectations model is
crucial for explaining the market behavior.
A reason for agents using boundedly rational expectations could be that ob-
taining and processing information is costly. If the net benefit of obtaining and
processing information is lower than the price of obtaining it, efficient use of in-
formation would actually be not to aquire it (Chavas, 2000). This was formalized
by Brock and Hommes (1997) who presented a model of agents making a rational
choice among prediction methods based on their past performance and the cost
of using them.
If a cobweb-type market is unstable it is interesting to study how this insta-
bility affects other markets. In an agricultural setting, commodities may be in-
terlinked on both the supply and demand sides since farmers can choose among
different commodities to produce and once the products are on the market con-
sumers may substitute between them. The supply side interaction of cobweb
markets was studied by Dieci and Westerhoff (2009, 2010) who allowed pro-
ducers to enter different markets. As exemplified by the authors, when a farmer
decides to reduce his production of rye, he may alternatively expand his produc-
tion of wheat. When cobweb markets interact in such a way, instability in any
one market may destabilize the other one. There may even be cases when en-
dogenous dynamics emerges although the markets in isolation would be stable.
Connecting two simple markets that in isolation have linear supply and demand
functions may produce long-run price fluctuations and even complex dynamics.
The question of the stability of interlinked markets is investigated in papers I-III.
2.3 Equilibrium and optimization modeling
An economic equilibrium is a state where no actor has any incentive to change
their actions or behavior. Prices and quantities of goods produced and consumed
are consistent with the strategies and expectations of the agents acting on that
market. It is common for models of both land-use and energy systems to assume
that these conditions are met, which defines them as equilibrium models. An op-
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timization model can be thought of conceptually as describing a world governed
by a social planner who for instance maximizes social welfare.
If all agents in a model maximize expected profits, are well informed about
internal and external factors affecting the market and the market is characterized
by perfect competition without externalities, finding the equilibrium of the model
can be done by transforming it into an optimization problem, where the objective
function is the sum of consumer and producer surplus. Equilibrium modeling and
optimization modeling can therefore in some cases both be used to solve the same
problem, although it is important to remember that not all equilibria are optima,
and not all optima are equilibria (as I already mentioned in Chapter 1). An ex-
ample of this dubble approach possibility can be given in relation to the land-use
model presented in papers I-III. Bryngelsson and Lindgren (2013b) showed that
the model has a unique steady state, and that it can be found both by solving for
the equilibrium and by maximizing the sum of consumer surplus and producer
surplus.
There are two major types of models, common for the study of both agri-
cultural and power markets, that use either market equilibrium or optimization
as their general solution methodology: (i) macroeconomic models and (ii) par-
tial equilibrium models (Knopf et al., 2013). Most of these models find inter-
temporal solutions through either a recursive dynamic solution methodology or
with inter-temporal optimization. Macroeconomic models include computable
general equilibrium (CGE) models which are solved recursively using market
equilibrium conditions, and optimal growth models which are solved with opti-
mization algorithms. Optimal growth models feature a representative agent with
perfect foresight that maximizes lifetime consumption. Partial equilibrium mod-
els, the second type of model, only takes into consideration part of the market,
e.g. the agricultural market or the energy market. Just as macroeconomic models,
partial equilibrium models can be solved with either recursive dynamic equilib-
rium methods (e.g. GLOBIOM (Havlík et al., 2011), a model of the agricultural
and forestry sector) or with intertemporal optimization (e.g. TIMES (Blesl et al.,
2012) a partial equilibrium model of the energy sector). In paper V we present an
intertemporal model of the power system that we solve by maximizing the sum
of consumer and producer surplus.
As I mentioned, equilibrium modeling is a common approach when study-
ing both agricultural markets and the energy market. In a review of 121 studies
quantifying the impact of increased bioenergy demand on agricultural commodity
prices 112 were either partial or general equilibrium studies (Persson, 2015). The
energy modeling forum (EMF28) assesses the transformation of the European
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energy system with 13 modeling teams, all using different types of equilibrium
models (Knopf et al., 2013).
2.4 Stability analysis
When dealing with dynamical systems it is often interesting to understand the
stability of their trajectories. If a system is subject to a small perturbation, will it
return to its initial state or diverge? The stability of our models is investigated in
papers I-IV.
The stability of a dynamical model of an economy depends inter alia on the
agents’ prediction method and on the price elasticities of supply and demand.
In a cobweb model with one single good the dynamics is unstable if agents use
the “naive” prediction method and the demand curve is steeper than the supply
curve. However, there are several factors that may stabilize the dynamics, such
as different kinds of inertia as well as better informed agents. When several
markets are interlinked, and agents are heterogeneous, the analysis becomes more
complicated. If the agent-based micro-dynamics can be projected to a closed
form dynamics of aggregate variables, like prices and quantities, the stability
characteristics can be analytically approached by linearizing the system around
the steady state. In paper III we discuss the model features that makes this kind
of projection possible.
Chapter 3
Background
The models presented in this thesis are applied to land-use (papers I-III), beef
production and the link between the beef and grain markets (paper IV) and finally
power production (paper V). In this chapter I give a background to these fields.
3.1 Price volatility
Volatility in prices is of importance to both producers and consumers and is
closely related to risk. In finance, volatility is measured as the standard devia-
tion in returns of an investment. If an asset has high volatility in annual return,
and this volatility is unpredictable, then the asset is risky. Most financial analysts
start by observing past time series since it is reasonable to assume that portfolios
with histories of high volatility also have the least predictable future performance
(Brealey et al., 2011).
3.1.1 Price volatility in agricultural markets
Agricultural markets are prone to volatility. On the world cereal market, prices
remained relatively stable for a few decades following the oil crises in the 70s,
but took off again in vivid movements in 2007 (Fig. 3.1). In the cattle and hog
sectors volatility has also long been observed, but with a more regular and long
term cyclical behavior (Figs. 2.1 and 3.2).
The recent price movement in cereal has caused major concern due to the re-
sulting welfare impacts on vulnerable poor. Episodes of high prices and extreme
11
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Figure 3.1: Monthly food price indices (2002-2004=100).
Data from http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/, visited 2015.
volatility are a major threat to food security in developing countries. Their im-
pact falls heaviest on the poor, who may spend well over 80% of their income
on food (Prakash et al., 2011). Today, a number of developing countries such as
Mali, Niger, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Lesotho, have diets with over 60% of
calories coming from coarse grains and in countries with rice-based diets such as
Bangladesh and Vietnam 70-80% of total food calories are derived from cereals.
In the world as a whole, cereals account for 49% of the direct food consump-
tion. Because of this, scholars have tried to understand the causes of the recent
volatility.
The interest in the cattle and hog cycles has been more focused on under-
standing how biological lags naturally tend to create cycles in both stocks and
prices. These cycles have been remarkably regular in their periodicity, over long
time scales and in different regions of the world.
For natural reasons a large number of studies on food price volatility have
been done since 2007/08 and a variety of factors have been identified to explain
the recent fluctuations. Prices may of course be affected by simple singular events
such as crop failure following extreme weather events or shock in demand from
war or economic crises. But most of the important recent factors work in more
intricate ways. We start with stocks, which are negatively correlated with cereal
price. With very low elasticity of demand, a small shock in supply or demand
may cause a large change in price, if stocks are low. This is what happened dur-
ing the 2007/2008 food crisis since world grain stocks fell to very low levels by
2006 (Wright, 2012). A quickly increasing demand for bioenergy as fuel, cou-
pled with a growing demand for meat in China and other countries, contributed
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Figure 3.2: Detrended total U.S. female cattle stocks (Aadland, 2004) and price of beef
in the US, deflated by CPI (Mundlak et al., 1995). Both cattle stocks and prices fluctuate
and show tendencies of a cyclical behavior.
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to the declining stocks. With jumping oil prices biofuel demand even exceeded
mandates. Theoretically stock levels increase again as a result of price volatility,
or at least as a result of expected volatility. If prices were believed to remain
constant, there would be no incentive for competitive storekeeping given the cost
of storing and the interest on capital. With increasing volatility and expected pe-
riods of elevated prices, keeping stocks once again becomes profitable. However,
stocks themselves counteract the tendency of any price spike which may bring us
back to a situation with low stocks. Another factor is speculation. When there is
a highly liquid market for food commodities–i.e. when there is a large volume of
trading opportunities–farmers benefit by having the choice not to bear the risk of
selling their crops on the spot market. Instead they can hedge against the risk of a
low spot market price through the futures market. Liquidity (defined as the num-
ber of contracts that have not yet been fulfilled through delivery) of commodities
such as wheat, corn and soybeans began to increase around 2003/04. There was
a short-lived decline in liquidity during the financial crisis, which began in the
second half of 2008, but has since then recovered. Although the “efficient mar-
ket” theory predicts that increasing the liquidity of markets also stabilizes prices,
many scholars disagree. See e.g. Ghosh et al. (2012) who argue that trading
volumes on the futures markets must be limited to stabilize food prices. Traders
may be ever so well informed of market fundamentals but will still make the
most rational investment by “anticipating what average opinion thinks average
opinion to be”, in the words of Keynes (1936). Bubbles could be initiated by a
few irrational investors or a large-scale trader deliberately moving the market in
a favorable direction. A final factor that I will mention here is policy interven-
tions. An example is how a group of countries in 2007-2008, most notably India
and Vietnam, restricted or even banned exports of rice causing the price to rise
outside these countries (Slayton, 2009).
This account of events shows that fluctuations may emerge not only as a result
of simple shocks in supply and demand, but also in more complicated ways where
endogenous effects play an important role. In many cases the expectations of the
economic actors are decisive. It is also clear that a specific agricultural sector
cannot be studied in isolation, since market interactions transmit instability from
one market to another, or even create instability where there otherwise would be
none.
In the hog and cattle sectors there is another dimension to the dynamics: the
dual nature of female animals as both a capital good (for their ability to produce
offspring) and as a consumption good. Due to the lengthy biological lags, current
breeding and consumption decisions have large effects on future stocks. These
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features have turned out to be important in explaining the observed cycles.
3.1.2 Price volatility in the power market
In the power markets there is volatility on two different time scales that are both
of interest. On the shorter time scale there is price volatility over the course of the
day. Demand is higher in the daytime than in the nighttime which usually leads
to higher electricity prices in the day than at night. In power systems with a large
share of solar and wind power, both which are intermittent and non-dispatchable,
the power price may change quickly from hour to hour depending on the output
of these technologies.
On the consumer side this volatility creates an incentive for demand response
technology, e.g., dishwashers that remain idle until the electricity price is low.
However, this would require a new type of metering system that measures end-
consumption hour by hour and charges consumers in proportion to the hourly
wholesale price. Small consumers’ meters currently only record consumption
with monthly resolution. On the supplier side price volatility is important for
the level of activity on the intra-day market and on the balancing market. An
increasingly important task for power system analysts is trying to predict the
prices on these markets and choosing which of these markets to sell power on,
hour by hour. In traditional hydropower and thermal systems, major changes in
the production schedules set the day before delivery have been relatively rare.
Acting on the balancing market can be an opportunity for flexible power plants
that are able to quickly change output. Flexible generators are, for example,
hydropower plants and combustion turbines that can be brought into service at
very short notice. These types of power plants will probably be increasingly
demanded in the future if variable renewable energy capacity continues to grow.
On a longer time scale there is a volatility in prices which affects the yearly
profitability of power plants, or yearly returns on investments. Part of the ex-
planation is that there is a tendency of investment cycles (IEA, 2016; Ranci and
Cervigni, 2013). When profitability is low power companies halt investments
which eventually leads to an increase in electricity prices. This triggers invest-
ments, and the cycle starts again.
3.2 World meat production
Meat production can be linked to both the average level and the volatility of grain
prices. In paper IV we investigate cattle cycles and a possible link to grain price
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volatility. In this section I give an overview to world meat production, and more
specifically to the cattle sector.
3.2.1 Overview
Pig, chicken and cattle dominate world meat production. Total production has
been growing quickly (see Fig. 3.3a) and its volume is today four times as large
as in the beginning of the sixties. The difference in growth is large, though,
between the different meat types. Chicken has grown by a factor twelve, whereas
cattle only has doubled. During the same period cereal production has grown by a
factor three (see Fig. 3.3b), and the fraction consumed as feed has varied between
35-42%.
Figure 3.3: (a) World meat production is dominated by pig, chicken and cattle. (b) A
fraction of 35-42% of cereal production has been consumed as animal feed since the
beginning of the sixties. Production of both meat and cereal has grown substantially in
the last 50 years. (The figures are made with data from FAO Stat.)
The pig sector is the largest contributor to global meat production. 61% of
the pig production is specialized industrial farming where all of the feed is non-
local (except in Sub-Saharan Africa where 25% of feed is local). Large-scale and
market-oriented pig production systems have achieved a high level of uniformity
in terms of animal genetics, feed and housing systems (MacLeod et al., 2013).
95% of the production takes place in East and Southeast Asia, Europe and the
Americas. Industrial pigs are kept solely for meat production, i.e. there are no
by-products with economic value.
Industrial chickens are either broilers (chickens reared for meat) or layers
(chickens kept to produced eggs for human consumption). All of the feed used
in industrial systems are non-local. Specialized layer systems contribute to only
6% of total poultry meat production, and this share is used for pet food or animal
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feed rather than for humans. Chicken systems, just as the industrial pig systems,
are relatively homogenous and standardized compared to cattle. The chicken
meat production is particularly high in Latin America and the Caribbean, North
America, and East and Southeast Asia.
Cattle are reared in quite diverse systems ranging from grazing to mixed
livestock-crop systems. The mixed systems dominate, with about 79% of beef
production and 85% of dairy cattle systems. Beef production occurs both in ded-
icated beef herds without milk production (56% of beef production), and in dairy
cattle herds (44% of beef production) where surplus calves are raised for beef and
also culled cows are used for meat.
Cereal feed use for pig, chicken and cattle currently account for about 32%
of world cereal production according to our estimation. The share is higher if
residues are included (see e.g. Wirsenius et al. (2010) ). Although chicken is a
very efficient animal in terms of feed conversion ratio, it stands for the largest part
of cereal demand by weight among the three animal types, if layer systems are
included. This is due to the high volumes of chicken meat and egg production.
(Feed conversion ratio is the efficiency with which the animal herd converts feed
into tissue.) The numbers that we have based the cereal feed consumption on are
given in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.
From now until 2050 world aggregated demand for meat is projected to grow
at only half the rate of the past 50 years, according to Alexandratos and Bruinsma
(2012). The reason for this is slower population growth and lower growth of per
capita consumption in the developing world. China and Brazil both increased
their per capita meat consumption hugely starting in the 1970s and are unlikely
to continue increasing their meat intake at the same rate. It is not believed that
any other developing country will have the same kind of consumption explosion.
India will probably increase its poultry consumption somewhat, but pig and cat-
tle will face cultural constraints in much of South Asia. The growth in dairy
products, on the other hand, is expected to show little decline.
In the last 50 years the feed use of cereals has been growing more slowly
than the livestock production for three reasons. Firstly, the share of the poultry
sector in the total meat production has been growing. Secondly, an increasing
share of the cattle systems are found in developing countries which are less feed
grain-intensive. Thirdly, there has been a shift towards more oilcake in the feed
rations. However, it is believed that this gap in growth rates will be reduced in the
future, partly due to developing countries increasingly shifting from grazing and
backyard systems to grain-intensive industrial systems. All in all, Alexandratos
and Bruinsma (2012), project the share of cereal being used for feed to be about
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the same in 2050 as today.
3.2.2 Demand for cereal as feed
Table 3.1 gives an overview of the three major animal types in the global meat
sector (pig, chicken and cattle) and their contributions to cereal demand. The
feed conversion ratio (FCF) is given as kg dry mass intake/kg live weight (LW)
or carcass weight (CW) output. The FCR includes the feed consumed by ma-
ture breeding animals that are not growing, or are growing slowly. The ration
composition and FCR refers to industrial systems in the cases of pig and chicken
whereas for cattle they are global averages. The ration shares are based on mass
on a dry matter basis. W.d.g. stands for wet distillers grain.
A difference between pig and chicken on the one hand and cattle on the other
is that the industrial pig and chicken systems are fairy homogeneous throughout
the world, whereas the cattle sector is very heterogeneous. The FCR of dairy
cattle is not given since there are two co-products: meat and milk. As a reference
though, the dairy system is around four times as efficient as the beef system in
transforming feed into protein.
The feed row shows how much cereal is demanded by the different systems,
and their shares of global cereal production. (Grains and cereal by-products are
counted together.) Here the feed demand is given as the current total demand
including non-industrial production.
The country lists show the countries with larges production based on weight,
for pig. The broiler column gives the countries with largest production of chicken
meat (including layer meat and backyard systems). In the layer column are coun-
tries with largest egg production. In the beef column are the countries with
biggest cattle meat production (from both beef and dairy systems), and in the
dairy column are the countries with larges milk production.
Ration composition and FCR are taken from MacLeod et al. (2013) for the
monogastrics and Opio et al. (2013) for cattle. Production is taken from FAO-
STAT. Our calculation of feed use give that pig, chicken and cattle together rep-
resent 32% of world cereal demand. According to Alexandratos and Bruinsma
(2012), the world feed use of cereals accounts for 36% of total cereal use. Our
lower value may be due to the fact that we only consider pig, chicken and cattle,
and leave out e.g. buffalo, small ruminants and other poultry apart from chicken.
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Table 3.1: Global production of pig, chicken and cattle.
Pig Chicken Cattle
-broilers -layers -beef -dairy
Production 66.6 84 5.3 (meat)
-industrial 56.9 (eggs)
-total 109 93 (all meat) 66 (all eggs) 35.4 27.7 (meat)
(Mt/y) 626 (milk)
Ration
Cereal
-grains 66% 67% 64% 8.0% 9.0%
Maize grain Maize grain Maize grain
Wheat grain Wheat grain Wheat grain
... ... ...
-byproducts - - - 0.9% 2.4%
bran bran
w.d.g. w.d.g.
Oilseeds 21% 26% 19% 2.7% 5.8%
Soybean meal Soybean meal Soybean seeds meal meal
FCR (LW) 2.7 2.0 2.3 (eggs)
(CW) 3.7 2.8 74
Feed (Mt/y)
Cereal 252 184 (meat) 104 (eggs) 146 127
Share of 9.8% 7.2% 4.0% 5.7% 4.9%
world prod.
Countries China USA China USA USA
USA China USA Brazil India
Brazil Brazil Brazil China China
Germany Russia Japan Argentina Brazil
Vietnam Mexico Russia Australia Russia
Spain Brazil Mexico Mexico Germany
Russia Iran Brazil Russia France
Mexico Indonesia Ukraine France NZ
3.2.3 Cereal as cattle feed
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show some regional specifics of the beef and dairy cattle sys-
tems. The feed conversion ratios (FCR) are given as kg dry mass intake/kg pro-
20 CHAPTER 3. BACKGROUND
tein output. As opposed to the industrialized pig and chicken systems, the cattle
systems are very heterogeneous. The most efficient systems are found in North
America, Europe and Oceania whereas production in South Asia and Sub Saha-
ran Africa are particularly inefficient. Cereal consumption for feed is especially
high in North America, despite the efficient systems, both due to the large pro-
duction of meat and milk, but also due to the high share of cereal in the feed
rations. Cereal consumption for feed is also fairly high in Latin America and the
Caribbean, despite the low share of cereal in the feed rations, since the production
of primarily meat is very high.
Table 3.2: Beef cattle
Meat (Mt) FCR (protein) Cereal/ration Cereal (Mt)
N. America 9.9 180 17% 56
Russia 0 - - -
W. Europe 2.2 150 12.3% 7.5
E. Europe 0 170 14.0% 0.1
NENA 0.1 425 0.9% 0.1
E & SE Asia 6.7 470 4.4% 26
Oceania 1.7 220 17.5% 12
South Asia 1.0 1625 0.1% 0.3
LAC 12.0 405 4.8% 43
SSA 1.7 1175 0.1% 0.4
World 63
3.3 Connecting food, feed and bioenergy
There are two main factors that connect the markets for food, feed and bioenergy,
which are both considered in this thesis, (see Fig. 3.4). The first is agricultural
land which is a common but limited factor of production for food crops, pasture
and bioenergy crops. The second is cereal, where the end-use can be either direct
human consumption, feed for animals or feedstock for first generation bioenergy
production.
Bioenergy is part of many scenarios of a future sustainable energy system.
See, e.g., Deng et al. (2011), Azar et al. (2010) and Pacala and Socolow (2004).
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Figure 3.4: Land and cereal link the markets of food, feed and bioenergy.
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Table 3.3: Dairy cattle
Milk (Mt) Meat (Mt) FCR (protein) C/R Cereal
N. America 99 3.1 30 31.5% 37
Russia 32 1.6 60 10.1% 8.4
W. Europe 137 5.2 30 15.2% 26
E. Europe 42 1.3 35 12.1% 7.1
NENA 56 4.0 150 0.8% 3.2
E & SE Asia 52 2 75 7.7% 12
Oceania 30 1 40 14.3% 6.9
South Asia 77 1.5 200 0.2% 1.2
LAC 82 5.4 120 5.3% 24
SSA 20 2.5 400 0.2% 0.9
World 626
It is expected that lignocellulosic biomass will be the major future feedstock, with
the potential consisting both of residues and dedicated bioenergy plantations. In
the more biomass-intensive scenarios dedicated plantations will be a requirement
(Berndes et al., 2001). This brings us to land, our first issue, since energy crops
such as miscanthus, willow and eucalyptus will compete for agricultural land
with other uses such as food production and pasture. A conceptual partial equi-
librium model of global land use was developed by Bryngelsson and Lindgren
(2013a) to explore the long-term effects of large-scale introduction of bioenergy,
under different policy cases. The model includes three types of agricultural land
use: intensive production of edible-type and forage crops (IP), extensive produc-
tion of permanent pasture and forage crops (EP) and production of lignocellu-
losic bioenergy crops (BE). They find that a large-scale introduction of bioenergy
would raise food prices in all of their cases/scenarios investigated. If bioenergy
production is restricted to “marginal land” the price impact on food is dampened,
but incentives would be high for farmers with more productive land to cheat and
also produce bioenergy crops. The division of land use into these three types of
land use is adopted in Papers I-III.
The second factor connecting food, feed and bioenergy is cereal. About 36%
of world consumption of cereals goes to feed. The share of cereals for biofuels
was 3% in 2005, or 65 million tonnes, but is projected to increase to 180 million
tonnes in 2020 (Alexandratos and Bruinsma, 2012). The effect on food prices
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of using cereals for biofuels has been investigated in a number of studies. Their
conclusions deviate, though, as shown by Persson (2015). (The majority of the
studies reviewed by Persson focus on the increased demand for corn ethanol in
the US.) It is clear that the demand for cereal feed also affects food prices, at
least in the short term. A way of exploiting this fact to hedge against food price
spikes was proposed by Wright (2012) who suggested that option agreements
between governments and animal feeders (or biofuel producers) could enable a
diversion of grain from meat (or biofuel) production to human consumption in
times of cereal shortage. However, Locke et al. (2013) showed that any grain
diversion scheme in a developing country with vulnerable poor is unlikely to
affect domestic grain prices if not export bans (in grain exporting countries), or
mandatory import quotas (in grain importing countries) are imposed.
3.3.1 Biological lags and the emergence of cycles
The existens of hog cycles was observed as early as 1818 (see section 3.2.3).
Cycles in prices and quantities of cattle were also observed and documented, at
least as early as 1876 (Mundlak et al., 1995). As we have seen, Ezekiel explained
the hog-corn cycles with naive expectations in markets with linear supply and
demand. The reality is of course more complicated. Hogs and cattle may be
slaughtered over night in response to market signals, but producing them again
takes considerably longer time (Holt and Craig, 2006).
Jarvis (1974) pointed out that higher beef prices should induce rational farm-
ers to increase the slaughter age. (With higher prices it is worth the extra effort
of keeping the animals alive a bit longer, even though the marginal weight gain
decreases.) The short-term effect of a price increase should therefor be a reduc-
tion in slaughtered animals. This contrasts with the supply respons of most other
agricultural products, for which there is normally no reason to expect output to
fall when prices increase.
Rosen (1987) backed up the hypothesis of short-term negative supply re-
sponse, but only when the change in demand is expected to be permanent. An
important mechanism in his model is the dual nature of female cattle as both a
capital good and a consumption good. If the future meat price is expected to be
high the rational farmer would save a larger share of the young females to in-
crease the size of the breeding herd, thereby reducing the short-term supply of
meat to the market.
Important for the cycles are the biological lags in the production of hogs
and cattle. Rosen et al. (1994) showed that this feature made it possible to have
regular cycles in the aggregate cattle stocks in respons to exogenous shocks, even
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when ranchers are perfectly rational and profit maximizing. This is not to say,
though, that ranchers necessarily are perfectly rational and profit maximizing.
Aadland and Bailey (2001) differentiate between fed and unfed beef, the for-
mer being high quality meat from younger animals finished in feedlots, while
the latter is lower quality beef from adult cows. With this assumption, and by
keeping track of the age distribution of the stock Aadland (2004) manages to get
a closer fit to real world cycles. The model presented in Paper III is inspired by
Aadland.
3.4 Investment in the power sector
Over the last 20 years the electricity markets in the advanced economies have un-
dergone a liberalization, abandoning their status as national monopolies (Ranci
and Cervigni, 2013). Investment in new power capacity is now governed by
expected profitability as opposed to the traditional approach, where investment
responded to reliability and resource adequacy requirements. Engineering stan-
dards specified the acceptable hours of load shedding, based on the expected
load variance and generator availability. In the present system investment in new
capacity is made when the discounted revenues from the sale of electricity and
ancillary services are expected to cover the investment cost, i.e., when the project
has a positive net present value (NPV).
In this chapter I discuss what discount rate an electric utility might use when
assessing an investment opportunity, and how this discount rate relates to the per-
ceived risk of the project (section 3.4.1). (However, I do not go into how the
level of risk is determined.) The important point is that investors generally use a
higher discount rate than the social rate of discount (explained in section 3.4.2).
What discount rate to use in a modeling exercise depends on what the purpose of
the study is. Are we trying to mimic the behavior of real market actors? Are we
evaluating energy systems costs from a societal perspective? Are we perhaps as-
sessing the potential of policy measures to improve the institutional environment
for investors so that their risks are lowered?
The choice of discount rate tends to play a large role for the model output.
Iyer et al. (2015) show that the carbon price needed for a certain CO2 emissions
target increases significantly when a more realistic representation of investment
risk is adopted in an integrated assessment model, instead of using a modest and
homogenous discount rate across all technologies and regions of the world.
In section 3.4.3 I discuss what selection rule is reasonable to implement in an
ABM when agents choose among different projects to invest in. Even if we have
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decided what discout rate to use, and even if we want to model agents as simply
maximizing expected profit, the choice is not trivial and it is a question that we
spent a lot of time on when working with paper V. If agents simply choose the
project with the highest NPV (assuming it is positiv), the model will exaggerate
the expansion of large power plants and disfavor small ones. Richstein et al.
(2014) solve this problem by letting agents select the power plant with the highest
NPV per MW capacity. As you will see, we have chosen another route.
3.4.1 Risk and discount rates
The first criterion for electricity utilities when considering an investment opportu-
nity is that it has a positive net present value, NPV. Let P denote a specific project
under consideration, say an investment in a new power plant. If the investment
cost and the future net cash receipts each year during the project’s lifetime are
known, the NPV of the project is
NPV (P) =
T
∑
t=1
Ct
(1+ r)t
− I (3.1)
where
Ct = the net cash receipt during year t
I = the initial investment
T = the project’s duration in years
r = the discount rate, in this case the return on the best alternative safe invest-
ment in the financial market, which is foregone by instead investing in the project.
However, the revenues from the project are uncertain since the future electric-
ity price is unknown, and the project also involves other risks. Should the power
company undertake the project or not? A theoretical approach to choice under
uncertainty is the expected utility model (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944).
The expected utility (u) of the project is
Eu = Eu(NPV (P)). (3.2)
The utility function u of an investor is typically concave, which means that gain-
ing 2 Me is less than twice as good as gaining 1 Me. Why is it important to
consider the expected utility of the project’s NPV, and not the utility of the ex-
pected NPV of the project? Let us look at a simple example. Assume that a
certain project can have two possible outcomes: it can cause a stream of costs
and revenues with a NPV of either plus or minus 1 Me. Let us assume that both
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outcomes have equal probabilities so that the expected NPV of the project is 0
Me. Suppose that a 1 Me loss would force the company to declare bankruptcy,
but a 1 Me gain would simply make the company somewhat better off. In this
case it is obvious that the expected utility of the project’s NPV is negative while
the utility of the expected NPV of the project is zero. Using the expected utility
method is therefore a way of handling risk. A standard constant elasticity utility
function is
u(c) =
c1−η
1−η (3.3)
where η is a measure of risk aversion and c in our case is the NPV of the project.
η = 0 gives a linear utility function and complete risk neutrality while η > 0 is
consistent with risk aversion. The observed behavior of financial actors implies a
value of 1≤ η ≤ 5 (Kolstad et al., 2014).
However, most companies do not perform this analysis but instead take a
shortcut by simply calculating the NPV of investment opportunities with Eq. (3.1)
using a discount rate that is substantially higher than the risk-free market interest
rate. The proper discount rate to use in this case is the return offered by the
best alternative risk-equivalent investment in financial markets (Brealey et al.,
2011). This is the opportunity cost of capital since it is what you are giving up
by investing in the risky project.
A rationally chosen discount rate is therefore project specific and depends on
project risk, not on the company undertaking the project or on how the project is
financed (with internal financing, debt or equity). In practice, however, it is often
difficult for companies to determine the exact level of risk of a specific project.
Therefore companies usually use the company cost of capital as a benchmark for
the internal discount rate (Brealey et al., 2011). The company cost of capital can
be defined as “the expected return on a portfolio of all the company’s existing
securities” and can be calculated as a weighted average of the company’s cost
of debt and cost of equity. For a project that is equally risky as the average of
the company’s other assets, the company cost of capital is the right discount rate.
For projects of other levels of risk the company makes a subjective judgment on
how much to add to, or subtract from, the company cost of capital. In the power
market each plant type has its own risk profile that is also strongly affected by the
overall capacity mix of the market (Tietjen et al., 2016).
3.4.2 The social rate of discount
The social rate of discount is used to evaluate the social value of long term
projects such as education, roads or public infrastructure in general. It is used
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both for the ex ante decision of whether a specific project should receive funding,
and the ex post evaluation of its performance. As Kolstad et al. (2014) explain,
the social discount rate can be determined with either a descriptive or a norma-
tive approach. With a descriptive approach the way to determine its value is to
empirically examine at what rate society is willing to postpone a unit of current
consumption in exchange for more future consumption. A common assumption
is that the market interest rate reveals these preferences. If this assumption is
accepted the social discount rate should be set equal to the real returns on safe
investments such as government bonds (which is assumed to be equal to the risk-
free market interest rate). The choice of market interest rate as the social rate
of discount can also be made using an arbitrage argument. If a project gives a
smaller return than the risk-free market interest rate, the capital could have been
better spent investing it in the government bonds. The arbitrage argument can be
motivated when projects are financed by a reallocation of capital, but not when
they are financed by an increase in aggregate saving (reduced current consump-
tion). See e.g. Zhuang et al. (2007) for more details.
Using the market interest rate as a descriptive approach to determining the
correct social rate of discount has its drawbacks. For several reasons it does not
reflect true preferences of society. Market actors have difficulties of both ob-
taining correct information and making rational decisions under uncertainty, and
they also tend to be more impatient than what is sensible (Diamond, 1977). The
descriptive approach is also problematic since it merely captures the impatient
attitude of current consumers toward transferring their own consumption to the
future, not the preferences of individuals when they see themselves as part of so-
ciety. When analyzing situations with more than one generation involved (time
horizons of more than 30-40 years) there are good reasons to treat the choice of
social discount rate as a normative problem (Kolstad et al., 2014; Zhuang et al.,
2007).
The standard method of calculating the social rate of discount with a norma-
tive approach is to use the Ramsey rule (Ramsey, 1928):
r = δ +ηg (3.4)
where r is the social discount rate, δ represents the pure time preference, η is the
elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption (as in Eq. 3.3) and g is the long-
term average real GDP growth per capita. The choice of g is a matter of making
an informed prediction, while the choices of δ and η involve normative value
judgments (although some scholars do attempt to derive these values empirically
with different creative approaches (Zhuang et al., 2007)). When summarizing
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the views of “prominent authors and committees” on δ , η and g, the IPCC finds
recommendations for the social discount rate r in the range of 1.4-16%/year, with
most recommendations ≤ 6%/year (Kolstad et al., 2014). In practice there are
several more ways of determining the social discount rate than what we bring up
here, some being quite elaborate. Zhuang et al. (2007) gives a thorough review
of what policy practices are actually followed by countries around the world in
this matter.
In a model aiming both to predict the effect of different policies and to evalu-
ate the outcome for society, a risk adjusted discount rate should be used to mimic
the behavior of real actors, while the social rate of discount should be used for
the ex-post evaluation of the outcome.
3.4.3 Prioritizing among projects
In an interview with representatives of Dutch power companies about their invest-
ment strategies, Groot (2013) found that an important goal is to select projects
with a positive NPV. The study found that many other considerations also are
taken into account before an investment is made. Among these are to maintain a
healthy cash position, which puts a limit on the number and size of investments
that a single company commits to. Some actors also find it important to not “do
worse than the competition”, which leads to an imitative behavior. Some actors
wish to increase their experience level of a technology that is new or unknown
to the company, e.g., renewable energy technology. In many cases a portfolio
approach is adopted. Companies with a large market share may refrain from in-
vesting in a new power plant if the merit order effect reduces profitability of the
company’s old plants. Roques et al. (2008) note that for large electricity genera-
tors the optimal strategy, depending on the character of the market risk, may be
to invest in a diversified plant portfolio.
The agent-based approach is well suited to included the kinds of investment
criteria stated above. In our first study of investors in the power market we limit
agents to maximizing expected profits, with no portfolio approach. The basic
rule, according to theory, when assessing an investment opportunity is to accept
it if its NPV is positive and otherwise reject it. However, in practice a company
may have many different investment opportunities with positive NPV and if it is
not possible to undertake them all at once the company will want to start with the
most attractive one. At first thought it may seem obvious that the project with the
highest NPV is the most attractive. However, with this reasoning a small power
plant may never be built even if its return on investment is high.
One starting point is to assume that financial resources are limited, i.e., that
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there is capital rationing. For large corporations capital is generally not limited
since they easily can raise large sums of money on fair terms. Why then do we
need to consider capital rationing? Brealey et al. (2011) explain:
"Many firms use soft capital rationing, that is, they set up self-
imposed limits as a means of financial planning and control. Some
ambitious divisional managers habitually overstate their investment
opportunities. Rather than trying to distinguish which projects re-
ally are worthwhile, headquarters may find it simpler to impose an
upper limit on divisional expenditures and thereby force the divi-
sions to set their own priorities. In such instances budget limits are
a rough but effective way of dealing with biased cash-flow forecasts.
In other cases management may believe that very rapid corporate
growth could impose intolerable strains on management and the or-
ganization. Since it is difficult to quantify such constraints explicitly,
the budget limit may be used as a proxy."
When capital is scarce the choice of investment opportunity should fall on the
project with the highest return on investment, or profitability index, where
pro f itability index =
NPV
I
. (3.5)
However, this method is not necessarily the best if new investment opportunities
arise in the future and resources are constrained in more than one time period. In
that case it may be preferable to select a project that generates early rather than
late revenues so that this money can be re-invested. If two projects have equal
profitability indices but different lifetimes, it is generally better to choose the one
with the shortest lifetime. If all present and future investment opportunities are
know, the optimal strategy can be found by working through all possible com-
bination of projects to see which one maximizes the total combined NPV, given
whatever constraints there are. Alternatively, a linear programming technique
can be used which is usually quicker and easier. In paper V we simply let agents
select the project with the highest annuity of the return on investment, i.e., the
highest
CRF ∗NPV
I
(3.6)
where
CRF =
r(1+ r)T
(1+ r)T −1 (3.7)
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is the capital recovery factor, T is the lifetime of the project and r is the discount
rate, as before.
In real life not all companies behave in an economically sophisticated way.
In a survey with 392 Chief Financial Officers Graham and Harvey (2001) found
that 57% of them always or almost always use the payback period as a capital
budgeting technique, even though this method ignores the time value of money
and cash flows beyond the cutoff date. Only 12% of the Chief Financial Officers
reported that they always or almost always use the profitability index. Investigat-
ing different investment criteria in an ABM is an interesting topic for a possible
future study.
Chapter 4
Paper overview
4.1 Interacting cobweb markets
In papers I-III we take a land use model developed by Bryngelsson and Lindgren
(2013a) as our point of departure and transform it into an agent-based model
where the agents are farmers, each possessing land of different quality. The
agents, in their production decision may choose among three generic crop types:
intensively produced edible-type and forage crops (IP), extensively produced per-
manent pasture and forage crops (EP) and bioenergy crops (BE). In the first two
papers we assume that all crops are put on a global market after harvest, where
their prices are determined. In paper III we assume that the world is divided into
different regions and that all harvested crops are offered at the regional market.
Trade is allowed between these markets, but is associated with a transportation
cost.
In paper I we apply the model to three cases with different bioenergy demand.
Since land is a limited factor of production and agents can choose what market
to enter, these markets are connected on the supply side, as explored by Dieci
and Westerhoff (2010). We consider two types of predictor functions, in the style
of Brock and Hommes (1997): “naive” and “rational”, the latter having perfect
information about next year’s prices. We have two aims with the paper. The
first is to extend the research on interacting cobweb markets that was initiated
by Dieci and Westerhoff (2010), by applying a model of such a system to the
question of competition for land between bioenergy and food production. The
second is to introduce a new combination of heterogeneity that includes both
production capabilities and price expectations to the cobweb model, which has
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not been done before.
We show that our model is highly unstable, which can be illustrated by Figs. 4.1
for one of our bioenergy cases. The graphs show the profits of growing each of
the three crops on land of relative quality Y . Since the agents try to maximize
profits, the most attractive crop on land of relative quality Y is the one with high-
est profit. The bottom panel shows the profitability in equilibrium, the upper left
panel the profitability if prices are 15% below equilibrium, and the upper right
panel the profitability if prices are 15% above equilibrium. We can see that rel-
atively small changes in prices have large effects, on many pieces of land, on
which crop is the most profitable to produce.
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Figure 4.1: Profitability for each crop type, on different land qualities, given that prices
are 15% under equilibrium prices (upper left panel), at equilibrium prices (bottom
panel), and 15% above equilibrium prices (upper right panel).
In the paper, we show that, under certain circumstances, the agent-based dy-
namics can be projected to a dynamic based on aggregate quantities (and prices).
This allows for a deeper analysis of the stability characteristics of the model. Two
of the factors that influence the stability are the fraction of producers that have
the opportunity to change crops at each time step (γ), and the share of rational
agents (ρ). In the case when we have a uniform, and constant, distribution of
the rational and naive agents, we show that an increasing fraction of naive agents
tends to increase the volatility, while if the rational agents have a share that ex-
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ceeds 50%, the system is always characterized by a stable steady state. If the
fraction of agents allowed to change crops at each time step (γ) is sufficiently
small, the steady state is stable regardless of which of the prediction methods the
agents use. These results can be formalized in the following proposition which
we present in papers I and III:
Proposition:
We consider the case when the quantity dynamics is unstable and charac-
terized by real-valued eigenvalues λ j < 1 and the most dominating one λ1 <−1
when all agents are naive (ρ = 0) and all may change crops each time step (γ = 1).
Now, assuming general values for the parameters γ and ρ , let q(t) denote the
quantity dynamics. The steady state q∗ is stable if
ρ >
1
2
− 2− γ
2γ(−λ1) . (4.1)
In a model extension we let agents dynamically choose predictor strategy, as
in Brock and Hommes (1997), we find that the more costly “rational” predictor is
concentrated on some key parcels of land, where fluctuations in what is produced
otherwise would be very high (see Fig. 4.2). This enables the model to stabilize
with a relatively low fraction of “rational” agents, which benefits agents also on
other parcels of land, who themselves use a “naive” predictor. However, this
adaptive dynamics in choice of predictor strategy can in itself cause boom and
bust cycles.
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Figure 4.2: Time averaged distribution of rational agents as a function of land quality.
The rational agents are more frequent on land qualities where there is larger instability
in terms of which crop is most profitable.
In Paper II we extend our analysis of market interaction by also including
demand side interaction. This link materializes when consumers are willing to
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substitute one good for another. This means that there is a cross-elasticity of
demand between them, and the price of a good depends on the supply of both of
the goods. In this version of the model we convert the generic crops in Paper I
to generic crop categories, and allow more than one generic crop within each
category. The reason for this is that we are interested in how larger number of
crops would affect the dynamics of the model since many applied equilibrium
models used for bioenergy assessments generally have a quite extensive set of
crops (see e.g. Havlík et al. (2011)).
The aim of the paper is to answer the question of how much our system is
destabilized by increasing the number of crops, and how much a “link” on the
demand side (through substitutability of commodities) counteracts this destabi-
lization.
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Figure 4.3: Fluctuations in prices and quantities produced for different levels of supply
side linkage.
In the simulations we randomly allow 10% of the agents to switch crop each
time step, with each time step representing a year. Fig. 4.3 illustrates the effect
on model dynamics of providing increasing amounts of options to the agents
(farmers) in their production decisions. In the left and center panels we have
one single crop in each generic crop category. In the left panel agents are not
allowed to choose which of these to produce, only if they will produce a certain
designated crop or not. We can see that the markets for IP and EP are in isolation
stable, whereas the BE market is highly unstable. In the middle panel the three
crop types are “linked” on the supply side, as in Paper I. Quantities produced of
all the three crops now exhibit non-periodic fluctuations over the years. We can
deduce that the instability of the system is a result of BE being present as a land
use option. The instability of the BE market is transferred to the IP and EP prices
when the three markets are interlinked. In the right panel we have divided each
generic crop category into four crop types, without any demand side substitution
between them. The figure shows the total quantities produced of each generic
crop category. We can see that the total quantities produced in each crop category
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is much more volatile than when there was only one crop within each category.
We now investigate whether a link on the demand side (i.e., a cross-price
elasticity of demand between crops in the same category) can mitigate the added
variability. We vary the degree of substitutability, from completely independent
goods to perfect substitutes. Fig. 4.4 shows the standard deviation in prices, when
there is either one or four crops in each category. In the left panel we show the
extreme case with no cross-elasticity of demand between the crops (also corre-
sponding to the center and right panels of Fig. 4.3). The right panel shows the
other extreme, when the crops within each category are perfect substitutes.
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Figure 4.4: Standard deviation of prices, in percent, for IP, BE and EP with each generic
crop category divided into 1 or 4 sub crops. In the left panel crops are completely inde-
pendent, whereas in the right panel crops within each category are perfect substitutes.
We find that with perfect substitutability the number of crops within a crop
category is essentially irrelevant for system stability. We conclude that in any
study of price fluctuations in a cobweb model of land use the supply and demand
side representations are vital for the outcome. Supply side interdependency tends
to increase price fluctuations while demand side interdependency tends to reduce
price fluctuations.
In paper III we discuss further the model features that make it possible to
project the agent-based micro-dynamics to a closed form dynamics on the level
of aggregate quantities. The projection from a high dimensional agent-based
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dynamics to a low dimensional dynamical system allows for the stability charac-
teristics to be analytically approached. We show that even though our system is
highly non-linear and the agents are heterogeneous (both in respect to production
capacity and with respect to how they make price estimates as a basis for produc-
tion decisions) the projection to a closed form dynamics is possible. The projec-
tion would also work if agents are allowed to invest in production efficiency, not
only what crop to grow.
A prerequisite for the projection to work is that individual agents keep the
same piece of land and the same prediction strategy over time. Also, the agents’
choice of crop to grow, or choice to invest in production efficiency, must only
depend on the price feedback from the market and not, for instance, on which
product the agent had in the previous period or on any information exchanged
between geographic neighbors. In paper I we let agents switch prediction meth-
ods over time, and as we saw the agents’ tendencies to choose the “rational”
prediction strategy depended on what quality of land they have. This is an exam-
ple of a case when the ideal projection to a closed form dynamics does not work.
In these types of model settings where the projection is not possible, it could still
be interesting to see whether an approximate aggregate dynamics could function
in a reasonable way.
4.2 Cattle cycles
In paper IV we present a model of beef cattle dynamics based on decisions taken
by boundedly rational farmers. Decisions concern whether calves should be sent
to feedlot for meat production or whether they should be saved for the breeding
herd. Decisions are also taken on the culling from the breeding herd. Two types
of meat are produced in this system: the fed meat from the calves selected for
feedlot and unfed meat from the culled cows. We systematically examine the
parameters determining the agents’ expectations and decision mechanisms, and
their impacts on the dynamics. These are a weighting parameter, for when agents
consider the moving average of past prices, a parameter governing a discrete
choice model for selecting calves to slaughter, and a parameter governing an an-
ticipation model, where agents anticipate future price changes whenever the herd
size changes. Markets remain stable when farmers react cautiously to new price
signals and when they are capable of anticipating future price changes. Gradually
relaxing these constraints we see the emergence of cycles in herd sizes, produced
quantities and prices, as has also been observed in data during the past century.
If we let the relaxation go too far markets eventually explode or collapse. In two
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suggested model extensions we highlight the link between beef production and
grain price volatility. Cattle cycles generate a varying demand for feed grain,
increasing price volatility. At the same time, the beef cattle system responds
somewhat to shocks in cereal price, thereby dampening price swings.
4.3 Energy system transitions
In paper V we compare two types of models: and ABM and an optimization
model, both representing the same stylized power system. The models are de-
signed to study the electricity system and capture both investments in power
plants made over time and output. Two main features distinguish the ABM from
the optimization model: limited foresight and a discount rate that may be higher
than the socially optimal one.
With the two models we study the dynamics of a large-scale expansion of
wind power triggered by a carbon tax. The aim of the paper is to explore the
importance of the investors’ beliefs for the evolution of the electricity market and
the transition to a low-carbon power system. We focus on three questions:
1. How does the required carbon price to reach a specific emissions mitigation
goal differ between the optimization model and the ABM?
2. How does the choice of internal discount rate affect the energy system?
3. How is the electricity system affected by the introduction of a carbon policy
and how does this play out in the two models?
We find that the required carbon tax to reach a specific emissions mitigation
goal is significantly higher in the ABM than in the optimization model, when
agents use a high discount rate. We also show that the agents on average would
have made a net loss from their investments, due to their limited foresight, if they
had not used the higher discount rate when assessing their investment opportu-
nities. However, if the agents use the same discount rate as in the optimization
model, the carbon tax may not have to be much higher in the ABM to reach the
same emissions target as in the optimization model.
The expansion of wind power decreases the capacity factors of the other
power plants, since wind has negligible running costs and comes first in the merit
order. However, wind is intermittent, and with limited storing capacity dispatch-
able power plants will also be needed in the system. If an expensive but carbon
neutral and dispatchable power technology becomes is available, and if the sys-
tem is to become carbon neutral, the social optimum in our system is to limit the
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expansion of wind power capacity in the near term. However, agents who invest
in wind power plants do not necessarily take into account the future profitabil-
ity of other agents’ power plants. When agents make large investment into wind
power capacity, the carbon neutral and dispatchable power technology can only
enter the market in the presence of a very large carbon tax. We conclude that
reaching a climate goal may be more expensive than what an optimization model
shows.
Chapter 5
Discssion
The models presented in this thesis are highly stylized, they are limited to de-
scribe only one or a few mechanisms at play in the real system, and none of them
are intended for making predictions. So, in the words of Epstein (2008), “Why
model”, if not for making predictions? Epstein mentions 16 reasons, and among
them I will highlight a few that I think applies to the work presented in this thesis.
The first two are to explain and to illuminate core dynamics. Simple models
may capture qualitative behavior of a system, and explain interesting phenomena.
Thes models are often both transparent and easy to use in an explorative way and
uncertainties are easier to understand (Köhler et al., 2015).
Another reason is to raise new questions. Many of the questions presented in
this thesis came to us after we first started modeling our systems. One example is
the question of when an agent-based micro-dynamics can be projected to a closed
form dynamics of aggregate variables (papers I and III). Another question arose
when we were working with paper V. We saw that limited foresight alone did
not significantly raise the tax level needed in the ABM to reach the same emis-
sions mitigation target as in the optimization model, when the available power
technologies were limited to coal fired power plants, CCGT, solar PV and wind
power. This raised the question of whether the results would differ if an expen-
sive but carbon neutral dispatchable power technology also were available, which
we also investigated.
39
40 CHAPTER 5. DISCSSION
5.1 Future research
There are two ideas of future research that we have planned to look deeper into.
The first one concerns the land-use model presented in papers I-III. We would
like to explore two specific mechanisms and their impact on system stability. The
first one is the option of storing harvested crops from one year to the next. It
costs money to store goods, and in the case of crops there will also be a certain
share that will be destroyed after long-term storage. However, it might still be an
attractive option for agents who believe that the future price will be significantly
higher than the current market price. Another mechanism is the option to sign
futures contracts allowing agents to settle a price in advance. The futures market
can offer both a price insurance to producers and an opportunity for speculation.
It is commonly thought that a high trading volume in the futures market stabilizes
prices at “fundamental” values, while other scholars disagree, see e.g. Ghosh
et al. (2012).
The second research idea relates to paper V and our models of a stylized
power system. From the start our goal has been to allow agents to take a portfolio
approach when making investment decisions. Before taking this step we chose
to explore a more simplified version of the model with a less complicated invest-
ment strategy, which resulted in paper V presented in this thesis. Here, agents
evaluate investment opportunities in isolation, not caring about how they might
affect the profitability of incumbent plants. However, if an agent is a large actor
in the power market, a new facility might shift the merit order curve in such a
way that he makes a net loss by investing in the plant, even if the plant by it-
self is profitable. Another aspect is how a portfolio should be designed to handle
risk in an optimal way. Agents may want to mitigate risk by investing in a vari-
ety of power plants instead of handling the risk of each investment opportunity
separately. Agent-based modeling is a suitable tool for investigating these issues.
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